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I 
When Aristotle returns to the topic of happiness at the end of the Nicoma­
chean Ethics (X.6-8) presumably to give us his final and best thoughts on the 
matter, he says that perfect happiness (he. teleia eudaimonia) is theoretical 
activity (the�retik� energeia), that happiness and contemplation (theoria) are 
coextensive, and that the life of reason (ho kata1ton � bios), also called 
the philosophic or theoretical life (I.5.1095bl9, �.E. I . 4. 1215bl-2, �passim), 
is the happiest life (X. 7 .1177al2-18, 1178a4-8, 8. ll 78b 7-32). He goes on to say 
that the life in accordance with the other excellence (ho kata tl!'n allen areten 
bios)--namely, the life in accordance with practical wisdom and moral virtue, 
elsewhere called the political or practical life (I. 5. 1095bl8, Pol. VII. 2.1324a40)-­
is the second happiest life (X. 8.1178a9-22). An'd he draws a sharp contrast between 
the activities that characterize the two lives: theoretical activity is leisured, 
aims at no end beyond its elf, and is loved for its own sake whereas practical ac­
tivity is unleisured, aims at an end (other than itself), and is not chosen for 
its own sake (X. 7.1177bl-26). As for the relation between the two sorts of activ­
ity, Aristotle implies that practical activity is merely a means to theoretical 
activity: " • • •  we work in order that we may have leisure and wage war in order 
that we_ may have peace" (X. 7 .1177b4-6). 
These remarks raise a major and well-known interpretive problem about Aris­
totle's· ethical ideal. and his conception of the best life for a man, for they seem 
to conflict with things he says earlier in the Nicomachean Ethics and elsewhere. 
They seem to conflict, in particular, with his account of the distinction between 
making (poiesis) and doing (praxis) and with the conclusion of the function argu­
ment. In distinguishing making and doing, Aristotle says that "the end of making 
is something different from the making, but not the end of doing; for good action 
(eupraxia) itself is� end" (VI.5.1140b6-7); and in arguing that the goodness of 
an action is unlike the goodness of a product of. one of the arts, he insists that 
for an act to be good it must be chosen for its own sake. The goodness of a pro­
duct of one of the arts (a shoe or a statue) is a quality of the work itself; but, 
Aristotle argues, the goodness of an act is not a quality of the act itself. Orte 
must also consider the agent's state of knowledge, his motive, and his character. 
For an act to be good it must be done with knowledge, it must be chosen and 
chosen for its own sake, and it must issue from a stable character (II.4.1105a26-
b9). This account of good action appears to directly contradict Aristotle's 
statement in the tenth book of the Nicomachean Ethics that practical activity, in 
contrast to theoretical, aims at an end (other than itself) and is not chosen for 
its own sake. 
The conclusion of the function argument is that "the good for man turns out to 
be activity of·soul in accordance with virtue (kat' areten), and if there are sev­
eral virtues, in accordance with the best and most final" (or "tnost complete", 
teleiotatc§n)(I. 7 .1098al6-'18). There are two interpretations of teleiotate arete. 
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II 
issu� raised by the apparent conflict of Aristotle's remarks in the 
of the.Nicomach�an Ethics with those expressed earlier in the treatise 
irt other works9 is that of the relation of the life of practical wisdom and 
virtue to the best life for a man--the relation of moral action to happi-
Does Aristotle abandon in Book X the view of Book I and elsewhere that 
nibral activity is a subordinate end, a component of happiness, in favor of the 
view tha:t it is merely a subservient end, only a means to happiness? 
The difference between a component and a means may be iilustrated by the 
difference between the activity of an ancient choregus in selecting the members 
of a chorus, outfitting it with costumes and masks, and providing for its training, 
which is one of the means to a dramatic performance, and the activity of the 
· 
chorus in the performance of a play, which is a component. though perhaps a 
secondary component, of the dramatic performance itself .10 This distinction is 
similar to one that Aristotle himself draws between a part (meros) and a neces� 
sary conditionll that is not a part (E.E. I.2.1214bll-27, Pol. VII.8.1328a21-b4, 
9.1329a34-39). A citizen� for example,-is a part of a poli"S"'(Pol. III.Ll274b38-41) 
whereas property is not a part but only a necessary condition (Pol. VII. 8.1328a33-35). 
Eating meat and taking a walk after dinner are for some people necessary conditions 
of health without being themselves parts of health (E.!. I.2.1214bl4-24). 
In Book X Aristotle seems to be espousing the view, which I shall call 
''strict intellectualism," that theoretical activity is the sole component of the 
best life for a man and that practical activity has value only as a means to 
theoretical activity. Some scholars have attributed this view to him without 
hesita£�on: Alexander Grant, 12 for example, in the nineteenth century and John 
Cooper today1. But some hesitation is in order. For strict intellectualism, as is well known, 4 in addition ta being inconsistent with the doctrine of Book I, 
has unpalatable moral consequences, which Aristotle (at least in his more worldly 
moments) would not accept;. According to strict intellectualism it would be right. 
for one person to steal from or to defraud another in order to obtain the wealth 
required to have the leisure for theoretical activity, for Qn this vitlw the end 
justifies the means. But Aristotle says that theft is always wrong: "It is not 
possible ever to be right with regard to these things [namely, such things as 
adultery, theft, and murder], but to do them is always to be wrong"(II.6.1107al4-15). 
Aristotle may be espousing strict intel'le.ctualism in Book X without being aware of 
its unpalatable consequences or in spite of them. Still, it niay be worthwhile to 
try once more to rescue Aristotle 1 s ethical philosophy from inconsistency and 
immorality. 
One possibility is that Aristotle is embracing a moderate rather than a 
strict intellectualism in Book X. By "moderate intellectualism" I mean the view 
that theoretical activity is the primary but not the sole component of the best 
life for a man, moral action being a secondary component. Moderate, unlike strict, 
intellectualism is consistent with the doctrine of Book I. But there are several 
versions of moderate intellectualism corresponding to the various ways of com­
bining moral and intellectual activity while preserving the primacy of the latter. 
And some of these have consequences almost as unpalatable as those of strict 
intellectualism. So it will be well before turning to Book X to sort and grade 
the various possibilities. 
Suppose that moral action; as moderate intellectualism affinns, has value in 
.
·
.,-, ,, , .,
.
' 
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itself and not simply as a means to theoretical1�ctivity. The value it has 
independently will then either be commensurable with the value of theoretical 
activity or µot. Suppose it is commensurable. · In this case the independent 
value of moral action can always be weighed against the value of theoretical . 
activity; and when a situation arises in which one must choose betWeen engaging 
in contemplative activity and performing some moral action, the activity of 
lesser value can bes.acrificed for that of greater value with the aim of maxi­
mizing the total value in one's.life. I shall call this the "trade-off" view. 
According to it, the value of theoreticaLa.ctivity, which for Aristotle resembles 
the activity of God, is related to the independent value of moral activity, 
activity that is wholly human, as the value of gold is to silver. The details 
of this view--namely, how to measure the value of moral and theoretical activity 
and how to balance the value of the one activity against the value of the other-­
are difficult to envisage, but the view is sufficiently precise for one to 
see some of its consequences. Since on the trade-off view the value of a morai 
action can sometimes exceed that of a competing theoretical activity, an adherent 
of the view will sometimes sacrifice theoretical for moral activity. He wight, 
for example, trade an hour of contemplative activity for an ·  act of liberality or 
munificence. Similarly, the owner of a silver mine might pay his workers in gold. 
On the other hand, it would be right according to the trade;..off view for a person 
·who is poor but intelligent to steal from or to defraud another person if this 
were the only means he had to obtain the wealth required to have the leisure for 
theoretical activity. For the value of an act of honesty (in this case refraining 
from theft or fraui\) can, on this view, be outweighed by the value of a certain 
amount of theoretical activity. An adherent of the trade-off view will, of 
course, have scruples in many cases where the strict intellectualist will not 
since the former, unlike the latter, needs always to consider whether the end of 
theoretical activity can be achieved without acting contrary t.o the moral virtues 
and, if not, whether the theoretical activity sought is worth the moral cost. 
Suppose, to take the other alternative, that moral action has value in 
itself and not simply as a means to theoretical activity but that the value it 
has independently is incommensurable with (and thus cannot be weighed against) 
the value of theoretical activity. One will want to consider in this case 
whether theoretical activity is absolutely prior to moral activity or not. If 
it is, we have the "absolute priority" view. An adherent of this view will act 
on the precept, Maximize theoretical activity first; then maximize moral activity. 
Thus he will perform moral actions for their own sake but only when they do not 
interfere with his theoretical activity. He will never, for example, sacrifice 
a moment of theoretical activity, however uninspired, for a disinterested moral 
action, however noble. The consequences of this view are only slightly less 
unpalatable than those of strict intellectualism. Unlike the strict intellectualist, 
whose attitude toward any action that neither promotes nor hinders his theoretical 
activity is indifference, an adherent of the absolute priority view will act in 
accordance with the moral virtues when unable to contemplate or to do anything 
that will promote his theoretical activity; but, like the strict intellectualist, 
he will do anything, however base, that promotes his theoretical activity. 
Suppose, to take the final case, that theoretical activity is the primary 
and moral action a secondary component of the· best life for a man, that the 
value that moral action has in itself is incommensurable with the value of 
theoretical activity, but that theoretical activity is not absolutely prior to 
moral action. There is a view that fits this description. According to it, 
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theoretical activity is more desirable .than moral activity--one would spend all 
of one's time engaged in it if that were humanly possible, which it isn' t--and 
is in :this sense the primary component of happiness. But what is most desirable 
must be pursued within the constraints placed upon a person by his bodily nature, 
by his. family and friends, and. by his polis. The idea is that theoretical ac­
tivity is to be maximized but only within the constraints of the life of practi­
cal wisdom and moral virtue. Moral activity is the foundation and theoretical 
activity the superstructure of the best life for a man. Moral action will not, 
on this view, be absolutely prior to theoretical activity. This view is not 
simply the converse of the preceding one. The demands of civic and domestic life 
are so indehni te and potentially s.o all consuming that there would few, if any, 
opportunities for contemplation if moral activity were given absolute priority 
over theoretical. Such a priority would violate the primacy of theoretical ac­
tivity. According to the "superstructure" view, the moral life sets certain 
minimum requirements that must be satisfied before one is· to engage in theoretical 
activity; but the view does not demand that one should riever shirk a duty, how­
ever trivial, for an opportunity to contemplate. Where the line is drawn will 
presumably be determined by the moral intuition of the practically wise man (ho 
phroniinos). 
-
The fol1owing table displays the various possibilities: 
Moral action 
component of happiness not a component 
(strict intellectualism) (moderate inF�-
value of, commensurable with 
� 
that of theoretical activity not commensurable 
(trade-off view) 
theoretical activity 
absolutely prior to 
(absolute priority view) 
III 
not absolutely 
prior to 
(superstructure 
view) 
Ackrill's and Cooper's acute but divergent discussions of Aristotle's 
account of eudaimonia exemplify in various ways each of the four specific possi­
bilities. 
Ackrill maintains that "the question [how theoria and virtuous action would 
combine in the best human life] is incapable of even an outline answer that 
Aristotle could accept" ("Eudaimonia", p. 357). Ackrill reaches this conclusion 
because it seems to him that Aristotle's theology and anthropology together 
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yield a consequence that is irreconcilable with his respect for ordinary moral 
views. A ck rill's argument, as I interpret him, goes like this. According to 
Aristotle's theology, the divine is incommensurably more valuable than the 
merely human. And, according to his anthropology, man is "a compound of 
'something divine' and much that is not divine"(p.358). Theoria is the 
activity of man's divine component while virtuous action belongs to his earthly 
nature. Therefore, theoria is "incommensurably more valuable" than virtuous 
action (p. 357) and in the best life for man must be given absolute priority 
over it (pp. 357-58). Aristotle's anthropology and theology thus lead to what 
I called the "absolute priority" view. But this view, Ackrill points out, has 
the consequence "that one should do anything however monstrous if doing it has 
the slightest tendency to promote theoria • • •  "(p.358)--a consequence that Aristotle 
must find "paradoxical" (ibid.) since he wishes to adhere "reasonably closely to 
ordinary moral views" (p. 35 7). 
"The only way to avoid such paradoxical and inhuman consequences," Ackrill 
believes, "would be to allow a certain amount of compromise and trading between 
theoria and virtueus action, treating the one as more important but not incom­
parably more important than the other" (p. 358). Ackrill thus for his own part 
endorses the trade-off view. But he seems to be mistaken in supposing that this 
view does not share some of the paradoxical consequences of the absolute priority 
view and in supposing that the trade-off view is the only alternative available. 
Cooper, in fact, attributes to Aristotle a view different from any that 
Ackrill considers. He finds what I have called the "superstructure" view in 
the Eudemian Ethics, in Books VII and VIII of the Politics, and in the middle 
books of the Nicomachean Ethics--namely, "a conception of human flourishing 
[eudaimonia] that makes provision for two fundamental ends--morally virtuous 
activity and intellectual activity of the highest kind. Neither of these is 
subordinate to the other; moral virtue comes first, in the sense that it must be 
provided for first, but once moral virtue is securely entrenched, then intellectual 
goods are allowed to predominate" (.£E._. cit., pp. 142-43). Cooper believes, 
however, that Aristotle adopts an intellectualist ideal of the best life in Book 
X of the Nicomachean Ethics and that he paves the way for this ideal in Book I 
(pp. 100, 14 7-48, et passim). By "intellectualism" Cooper means "the view that 
human flourishing consists exclusively in pure intellectual activity of the best 
kind" (p. 90)--the view that I have called "strict intellectualism." What leads 
Aristotle to embrace strict intellectualism, according to Cooper, is his doctrine 
that "one is his theoretical mind" (p. 168). Aristotle does not, on Cooper's 
interpretation, completely abandon the superstructure view; the life described by 
this view is simply downgraded in the final book of the Nicomachean Ethics from 
best to second best (pp. 177-80). 
Cooper ·is led to this interpretation of Book X partly by a philological 
consideration--namely, by what he thinks Aristotle can and cannot mean by the 
Greek word bios ("life"). This matter needs to be examined since it raises a 
fundamental issue of how Aristotle is to be read. 
IV 
What does Aristotle mean by a "life," a bias? The traditional answe;r6· is that each of the various "lives" that Aristotle mentions--the apolaustic, 1 the 
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'qua') locution as part of 
.. 
his
. 
standard terminology to signify one aspect of a 
thing in abstraction from all others. He says, to take a simple example, that 
"the infinite qua infinite is unknowable" (Phys. I.4.187b7; see also III.6.207a25..;. 
26) meaning by this that an infinite object need not be completely unknowable but 
on ly in the respect in which it is infinite� if a surface were infinitely long 
but only an inch wide, one could know its width but not its length. Or, to con­
sider another example, speaking of natural science Aristotle says that "there are 
many statements about things merely qua moving (he kin()umena), ,apart from what 
each thing is and from their incidental properties" (Met. M. 3.1077b23,....24). . . 
There is n ow an answer, or a sort of answer, to a puzzle that arose in ana-
lyzing the function argument. It seemed that of all living things God alone . 
lacked a distinctive function since his only activity, contemplation, is an activ­
ity in which man can share. The answer is that man does n ot engage in this activ­
ity as man but only as possessor of someth ing divine--namely, reason or nous. 23 
In so far as man can contemplate he is a god himself. 
v 
The way is now clear for an interpretation of Nicomachean Ethics X. 6-8 that 
minimizes· th e conflict between it and the rest .of the work. Aristotle begins his 
final and consummative discussion of happiness by considering whether happiness 
lies in play (X. 6). Th is preliminary discussion raises at least two interpretive 
questions. First, what exactly is th e view that Aristotle is considering? And, 
secondly, what contribution, if any, does this discussion make to Aristotle's 
ultimate conclusion that perfect happiness is theoretical activity? 
The word paidia, along with two other words that figure in the .discussion in 
chapter 6, paidikos ('childish') (1176b33) and paizein ('to play like a child'-'-
then: 'to play', 'to jest', 'to dance', 'to sing', 'to play at a game') (ll76b30, 3 3 ), 
is derived from the word pais ( ' child ' ) (l176b22, 2 3). This derivation undoubtedly 
assists the conclusion of chapter 6 that happiness does not lie in play (1176b27-28): 
since a pais is ateles (undeveloped) (see Pol. I . 12 .1259b3 -4), paidia Gan hardly be 
the telos (end) of a man (see !·!· II. l.1219b4-8). 
The ran ge of application of the word paidia is very wide. In Plato, for 
example, paidia covers among other things children's games (Polit. 308D3-4, Laws 
64 3B4-D4, 793E3-794A4), war games (Laws 829B7-Cl), singing and dancing (Laws 
803El-2), the mimetic arts from dancing to drama (Soph. 2 34Blff., Rep. 602B6-10, 
Polit. 288Cl-10), religious sacrifices (Laws 803El), puns (Grat. 406C3-4), and 
carousing (Prot. 347D6, Laws 673E8ff.). Human life for Plato is divided into 
just two ph�--play (p"rldia) and seriousness (spoude) (for the dichotomy s ee 
Rep. 602B8, Polit. 288C9-10, Laws 643B6, 647D6-7, 732D6, 797A7ff., 942A8).:...;.play 
being a prep arat ion for, a means to, or a relaxation from serious endeavors (Laws 
64 3B4-D4, 796Al-D5, Phil. 30E6-7). It is not so clear what act ivitie s Aristotle 
counts as paidi ai , for he is not as lavish with examples as Plato. But a few 
examples may be gleaned from the Nicomachean Ethics and the Politics. He mentions 
children's games (Pol. VII.17.1336a21-30) an d urbane and witty conversation 
(eutrapelia) (!.N. II. 7.1108a2 3-26 and IV. 8) and reports the common view that the 
purpose of sleep, drink, music, and dance is play and relaxation (Pol. VIII.5. 
1 3 3 9al4-21) . Interestingly, in chapter 6 Aristotle alludes to the things 
valued among boys (1176b22), to those who are ready-witted (eutrapeloi) in the 
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(102lbl4-23, Phys. VII. 3. 246al3-16). 
(3) having reached its end (telos): captured in English by such expressions 
as 'fully realized' and 'fully developed' and predicated, for example� 
of an adult in contrast to a child (102lb23-30, Pol. I. 12. 1259b3-4).2� 
If teleia has sense (1) in the expression he teleia eudaimonia, then Aristotle's 
conclusion expresses the strict intellectualist view that complete (or total) 
happiness is theoretical activity. If teleia has either sense (2) or sense (3), 
then his conclusioh can be given a weaker, moderate intellectualist interpretation-­
that perfect or fully realized, as distinct from complete, happiness is theoretical 
activity. 
Both formulations of Aristotle's conclusion will thus bear a moderate intel­
lectualist interpretation. Although such an interpretation even seems indicated 
for one of the two, the perfect ambiguity of the other makes one hesitate to 
claim on the basis of an analysis of the verbal formulations alone that such an 
interpretation of Aristotle's conclusion is demanded. One must also consider 
Aristotle's argument. What sort of intellectualism does it entail--moderate or 
strict? If Aristotle's argument entails one view but not the other, this is a 
good reason for attributing the one rather than the other to him.30 
On one interpretation strict intellectualism is entailed by that part of 
Aristotle's argument which is based on the philosophical idea that the activity 
that constitutes happiness is activity in accordance with excellence. This 
subargument opens (ll 77a12-21) and closes (1177b26-1178a8) chapter 7, though its 
leading ideas are introduced at the end of Aristotle's discussion of play (6.1177al-ll). 
Most English translations of these passages obscure the simple relations between the 
key terms of the argument and make it almo,st unintelligible, so a few elementary 
comments about its terminology are in order. The argument is based on the noun 
arete ('goodness', 'excellence', 'virtue')(see 1177a2, 10, 12, 17, b29) and three 
forms of the comparative and superlative of its simple adjective agathos ( 1 good'): 
comparative: 'better' 
belti�n (1177a3, 4, 6) 
kreitton (1177a6, b26) 
ameinon (1178a3) 
superlative: 'best' 
beltistos 
kratistos (1177al3, 19, b34, 1178a5-6) 
aristos (1177al3) 
Rendered literally, the argument of ll 77al.-21 runs as follows: 
1. Happiness is activity in accordance with goodness (al-2, 12). 
2. And the activity of the/ better part of a man is better and hence more 
conducive to happiness (a5-6). 
3. So the activity of the best part is best and most conducive to happiness 
(see al2-13). 
4. Reason (nous) is the best thing in us, and its objects are the best of 
knowable objects (a20-21, see Stewart, ad loc.). 
5. Therefore, the activity of reason is the best activity and the one most 
conducive to happiness. As Aristotle expresses it, " • • •  the activity [of 
reason] in accordance with its proper goodness will be he teleia eudaimonia" 
(al6-17). 
-
The premisses of this argument entail, not that theoretical activity is complete 
happiness, but only that it is perfect or fully realized happiness. 
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But when Aristotle returns to this theme at the end of chapter 7, he seems to 
advance beyond his earlier claim that reason is the best (but not the only) thing 
in us and to claim now that a man and his reason are identical: "This [viz. reason] 
would also seem· to ·be each man, since it is the authoritative and better part. 
Thus it would be-;ddif he were to choose not his own life but that of someone else" 
(1178a2-4). Similar assertions occur in two earlier passages in Book IX (4.1166al0-
23 , 8.1168b28-1169al8). However, the element or faculty with which a man is (or 
seems to be) identified is not the same in the two books. In Book IX the thinking 
or reasoning element (to dianoetikon, to nc;>oun, nous) w:i.th which a man seems to be 
identified (1166al6-1"'7," 22-23, 1168b35), since it1i"as the abilit3 to guide action 
and to control the passions, must be either his practical reason 1 or his intellect 
as a whole32--practical, productive, and theoretical. In Book X, on the other hand, 
the reason in question must be the theoretical reason alone. 33 For its activity 
is said to be theoretical (ll 77al7-18 et passim), and practical wisdom (pronesis) 
is explicitly distinguished from it (8. 11 78al6-22). 34 But, in spite of these dif­
ferences, the passages in Book IX, as we shall see, provide the clue to the proper 
interpretation of 1178a2-4. 
Now, if a man is strictly identical with his theoretical reason and if practi­
cal reason is not a p.art of theoretical reason, . then practical· reason is not a.· 
part of a man. On the strict-identity hypothesis practical reason will be merely 
something without which a man cannot exist, like food (Met. b..5 ,.. 1015b20-22)--not 
a part of man but only a necessary condition of his existence. 3:> Practical and 
theoretical reason will be related as the lower and higher order in Aristotle's 
ideal state (see Pol. VI. 4.129la24-28 and VII. 8-9). The warriors, officeholders, 
and priests who compose its higher order are its parts. The farmers, craftsmen, 
and tradesmen who compose its lower order, though the state cannot exist without 
them, are not parts of it: their role is to serve the members of the higher order. 
On the strict-identity hypothesis practical reason will be subservient to theoretical 
in just the same way; and Aristotle will, as Cooper claims (£E_. cit. pp • .  162-63), 
be embracing strict intellectualism. 
· 
But does Aristotle really mean to claim that a man is strictly identical with 
his theoretical reason? There is good reason for thinking not since his statement 
that reason "would also seem to be each man" (ll78a2) is immediately qualified: 
" • • •  for man, then, the life according to reason [is best and pleasantest], since 
this ·[viz.· reason] most of all (malista) is man" (a6-7). To be most of all man is 
t� be less than, and so nonidentical with' man. 36 That this reservation is seriously 
intended is indicated by its earlier appearance in the two passages in Book IX where 
a man is identified with his thinking faculty. In the first of these Aristotle says 
that "the reasoning element would seem· to be, or to be most of all (e malista), each 
man" (4. ll66a22-23); · and the reservation is repeated in almost the same words in the 
second--"That this [viz. reason] is, or is most of all (e malista), each man is 
clear" (8.1169a2). But to claim that reason is the�st-important, but not the 
sole, part of a man is simply to reiterate a premiss--namely, line (4)-.;..of the 
argument of 1177al-21, an argument that does not entail strict intellectualism. 
Other parts of the overall argument of chapter 7 that need to be examined are 
those in which Aristotle tries to show that theoretical activity is leisured and 
alone loved for its own sake whereas military and political activities (the pre­
eminent practical activities) are not chosen for their own sakes and are unleisured 
(1177bl-24). Aristotle offers the same consideration in support of both conclu­
sions--namely, that military and political activities aim at an external end but 
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and theoretical activity• The moral virtues have a role to play in both phases 
of life: "Bravery and endurance are needed for work, philosophy for leisure, 
temperance and justice at both times, and more especially when men observe peace 
and have leisure; fo r  war compels men to be just and temperate, whereas the 
enjdyment of good fortune and the possession of leisure accompanied by peace 
makes them rather insolent" <M· VII.15.1334a22-28). Aristotle's remark that 
work is for,the sake of leisure thus does not imply strict intellectualism. 
VII 
Chapter 8 contains three additional arguments for the conclusion that perfect 
happiness is theoretical activity. (1) The gods are paradigms of happiness but 
their lives consist entirely of theoretical, rather than practical or productive, 
activity; "so of human activities that which is most akin to this is the most 
conducive to happiness" (1178b 7-23). (2) The whole of the life of the gods, con­
sisting as it does of ceaseless contemplation, is blessed (makarios); so too is 
the life of man in so far as it is spent in such activity; but none of the lower 
animals are happy since they in no way share in contemplation. "As far, then, as 
contemplation extends, so also does happiness; and to those to whom contemplation 
more fully belongs happiness also more fully belongs, not incidentally but in 
virtue of the contemplation." Therefore, happiness is a kind of contemplation 
(b24-32). '3) He who exercises his (theoretical) reason is most loved by the gods; 
those most loved by the gods are the happiest; therefore, the wise man is the 
happiest (1179a22-32). 
The second argument requires examination, for the part of it that is directly 
quoted seems to identify happiness and contemplation straightforwardly and, con­
sequently, to be an unambiguous expression of strict intellectualism. But the 
argument will, I think, bear another interpretation. The second argument follows 
directly upon the first and begins with the words "A proof, too, is that • • .  " 
(s�meion de kai • • •  ) . This indicates that it is intended to establish the same 
.conclusioU-as the first--namely, that he teleia eudaimonia is theoretical activity 
(1178b7-8). Now, if he: teleia eudaimonia means, as it seems to, perfect or fully 
realized rather than-Complete happiness throughout X.7-8 and if makarios and 
eudaimonia mean teleia audaimonia in argument (2), then Aristotle's statement that 
happiness and contemplation are coextensive will mean simply that perfect or fully 
realized happiness is coextensive with contemplation. But this assertion is com­
patible with a moderate intellectualism that allows a place for the secondary 
happiness of moral and political activity. This interpretation also resolves a 
small puzzle about the argument--namely, that Aristotle's explanation of the 
fact that happiness is not attributed to the lower animals seems inadequate. They 
are incapable of happiness, one would suppose, not simply because they are inca­
pable of �ontemplating but also because they are incapable of practical 
thinking.47 But if Aristotle is thinking only of perfect or fully realized happi­
ness, his explanation is completely adequate. 
VIII 
Thus with the exception of the one statement that theoretical activity "alone 
would seem to be loved for its own sake" (1177bl-2) there seems to be nothing in 
X.6-8 that is inconsistent with a moderate intellectualism and with the rest of 
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the Nicomachean Ethics. This is a fairly weak conclusion. Can it be strengthened? 
Is there anything in these three chapters that can be taken to be an expression of 
moderate intellectualism? In particular, can anything be taken to be an expression 
of the only reasonable version of moderate intellectualism;... .,namely, the super­
structure view according to which theoretical activity is to be maximized within 
the constraints of the life of practical wisdom and moral virtue? 
Aristotle's famous injunction ''as far as possible to inunortalize oneself 
and to do everything with a view to living in accordance with the best thing in 
oneself [viz. the theoretical reason]" (7 .1177b33-34) is an expression of the 
superstructure view if the restriction signified by the words "as far as possible" 
includes moral restrictions as well as those of mind, body, and estate. Does it? 
The answer to this question can be gleaned, I think, from a passage in chapter 8 
where Aristotle is discussing the extent to which the theoretical life and the 
life in accordance with practical wisdom and moral virtue need external equipment 
and where he seems for once to combine the two lives: "The person who contemplates 
has no need of such things [viz. external goods] for his activity; but they are 
ao to speak even impediments-:Bt least to contemplation; however, as he is a man 
and lives with a number of others, he chooses to do those things that are in accord­
ance with [sci!. moral] virtue; he will therefore need such things with a view to 
living as a man" {ll 78b3-7). Here Aristotle states explicitly that the person who 
contemplates {ho theoron), qua man, chooses to act in accordance with moral virtue. 48 
Arthur Adkins in a recent article remarks, however; that Aristotle "does not tell 
us when he chooses: he may well mean 'chooses when theoria is not available. 'n49 
On Adkins' interpretation the author of this passage might without inconsistency 
condone the conduct of a man who refused to interrupt his theoretical activity in 
order to rescue a neighbor from a burning building. Thus Adkins believes the 
passage to be consistent with what I have called the "absolute priority" view--
the view whose precept is, Maximize theoretical activity first; then maximize moral 
activity. But there are at least two reasons for rejecting Adkins' interpretation. 
First, Aristotle says that the person who contemplates, qua�' chooses to act 
in accordance with moral virtue. But a person is not a man--that is to say, a 
human being--at one moment .. and at another not. He is a human being all of his 
life just as he is always an animal and always a living thing. Thus once the moral 
virtues are acquired he is always prepared to act in accordance with them. 
Secondly, possession of the moral virtues would seem to be inconsistent with their 
erratic exercise. The brave man defends his polis whenever the enemy attacks, not 
just at his convenience. Thus if the person who contemplates, qua man, chooses 
to act in accordance with bravery, he must always be prepared to sacrifice theoret­
ical activity for battle. So this passage does not seem to be consistent with 
the absolute priority view. It seems better to take it as picking up the theme 
of the function argument, the centerpiece of Book One: namely, that the various 
aspects of a person's total life...,-his life as a living thing, as an animal, as 
a man, and as a demigod--form a hierarchy with the higher aspects resting on and 
presupposing the lower. 
If my interpretation is correct, Aristotle does indeed subscribe to the 
superstructure view: one should seek to immortalize ones�lf but only within the 
bounds of the life of practical wisdom and moral virtue. O 
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35. See p. 4 above. 
36. See Daniel Devereux, ''Aristotle on the Active artd Contemplative Lives, " 
Philosophical 'Research ·Archives 3, no .. l.118. (1977), p. 7. 
3 7. See p. 1 above. 
38. See D. F. Pears, "Aristotle's Analysis of Courage," Midwest Studies in 
Philosophy, III (1978). 
39. On to kalon as an end of action and to aischron as an object of avoidance see 
nt-:7".1115bll-13, 23-24, 1116all-12 ,15; 8.1116a 28-3 2 ' b2-3, 19' �0-31, 
. 1117a 8, 16-17; 9.1117b9, 14-15; 12.1119bl6; IV.1. 1120a23:-24, 112lb4-5; 
2.1122b6-7, 1123a24-25; IX.8.1169a21-22, 28, 32, 35; X.8.1178bl3; and E.E. 
III.l.1229a2, 1230a29-33. 
40. See I.l.1094a6-9 and III.9.1117b7-8. When Aristotle says in speaking of 
bravery that "it is not the case, then, with all the virtues that their 
exercise is pleasant, except in so far as one attains the end" (III.9. 
1117bl5-16), the end in question is the external end. See also III.3.1112b33. 
41. On Hector's motivation see III. 8.1116a21-29. 
42. On this topic see also Ackrill's notes on 1139bl, 1176b7, and 1177bl-26 in 
Aristotle's Ethics. 
43. scil . of the two pre�eminent human activities. Happiness, of course, is 
loved for its own sake, 
44. Aristotle's Ethical Theory (Oxford, 1968), p. 356 • 
. 45. See Pears, 2£.• cit., p. 274. 
46. If it be objected that Aristotle, in giving his final account of happiness in 
X.6-9, seems to have forgotten his (implicit) distinction between an internal 
and an external end of action, the reply is that the internal end of action 
is alluded to twice in the course of these chapters: see X.6.1176b6-9 and 
8.1178bl2-13. 
47. See Ackrill, Aristotle's Ethics, ad. loc. 
48. Stewart, ad. loc. 
49. "Theoria versus Praxis in the Nicomachean Ethics and Republic," Classical 
Philology (forthcoming). 
50. Funds for reproducing this paper were provided by a grant from the Graduate 
School Research Fund of the University of Washington. 
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